Abstract: We consider openness in private and socially optimal licenses under conditions where network effects and multiperiod innovation are both possible. For private firms, we model a variety of possible business models from completely closed to fully open, and find that opening a platform can increase profits based on network effects exclusively, innovation exclusively, or both. A firm's ability to control downstream innovation gives it reason to rationally behave more like a social planner and even tolerate limited levels of piracy, interpreted as free user access. Further, open contracts with modest royalties offered to all developers can dominate closed Nash bargaining subcontracts with lead developers. We also find conditions when firms choose proprietary licenses despite innovation and network effects.
Introduction
Two principles compete in setting optimal length for protecting information and platform goods.
Based on the first principle-that incentives affect innovation-one camp of economic and legal scholars argues for indefinitely renewable copyright (Landes & Posner, 2003) and infinitely long but infinitely narrow patents (Gilbert & Shapiro, 1990 ). According to one argument, the production and maintenance of information will be greater under a regime of "perfect" control than any system of less control given (i) a sufficiently long time horizon and (ii) a positive relationship between control and incentives (Wagner, 2003) .
Based, however, on the second principle-that access affects social welfare-another camp of economists, legal scholars, and technologists assert that property rights interfere with adoption, Lessig, 2001) . This argument appears in one form among open source advocates as value created by peer review and network effects (Raymond, 2000) , and among free software advocates, who argue for greater social cohesion and for access freedom as a right (Moglen, 2003; Stallman, 1992 ).
This research explores tradeoffs between proprietary incentives and access freedoms that can promote both innovation and widespread adoption. The analytic framework we develop seeks to parameterize both dimensions and is quasi-open-adjustable between fully open and fully closed.
In one configuration, the model behaves as completely "free" in the sense that part of a platform is (1) freely available, (2) open to inspection, (3) modifiable, and (4) redistributable. 1 This leads to adoption, network effects, and free access. Alternatively configured, the model behaves as proprietary in the sense that any derivative works represent temporary monopolies. Modifications may be sold but are subject to disclosure requirements. This configuration restores profits, price signals, and incentives. Like free / open source software, derivative works are subject to free distribution and use, but unlike standard free software, these requirements do not bind for a brief proprietary period, specified by the platform author. During this time, 3 rd party developers may exercise pricing power based on the value of their innovations.
In practical terms, this framework generalizes a range of alternative technologies including 1 Free Software Definition, www.fsf.org.
fully closed systems such as those governed by restrictive "end user license agreements" (EULAs), partially open systems such as those exposing "applications programming interfaces" (APIs), open systems such as games where platform adoption for users is subsidized and profits derive largely from royalties on 3 rd party enhancements, and even completely free systems such as those distributed under the GNU Public License (GPL).
The intuition for this analysis proceeds specifically from software-and thus operates primarily under copyright 2 , but it applies potentially to any innovation with two properties: (i) the capital resource represents a platform on which subsequent innovation depends and (ii) property rights and contract law can alter the terms of access and subsequent disclosure requirements placed on derivative works. Both properties exist for operating systems, gaming platforms, audio and visual systems, and any form of software that allows plug-ins. This also applies to artistic works of "open content." To some extent, however, these properties also exist for hardware platforms, credit card networks, telecommunications infrastructure, gene sequences, and patent pools.
This research has several benefits. We extend the theory of two-sided network effects to include a production function that decision makers can harness to stimulate innovation. We then show how superior contract design can cause even profit motivated firms to behave more like social planners by helping them internalize value from future innovation. This solves a problem of disclosure and enablement, inherent in current law, that discourages "open science" (David, 2003) and permits functional aspects of code to remain as trade secrets. It can also explain how, in the absence of contract, these benefits fail to emerge due to a prisoners' dilemma among distributed developers.
Following a review of related literature, this paper develops an analytic model of tradeoffs among the welfare interests of the original platform author, the users, and 3 rd party developers. We show how too much protection can reduce welfare and hurt the interests of even profit-motivated firms.
We also analyze the welfare effects of competing stylized contracts, including those designed to maximize freedom. Importantly, the free access necessary for increased welfare and subsequent innovation is not always incentive compatible. Achieving the best of both free markets and free access then requires careful mechanism design. We conclude with a discussion of broader implications.
Literature
Considering socially efficient copyright terms, Landes and Postner (2003) observe that a need to maintain, not merely create, information goods provides reason to confer property rights, which can extend to indefinite renewal. Applying an overgrazing insight from the "tragedy of the commons," they also prefer exclusive rights when congestion and overuse dilute brand equity. Related work on patents examines the question of optimal length and breadth, finding that property rights should be long-lived, infinite in fact, and narrow when the flow rate of monopoly profits causes welfare losses (Gilbert & Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990 ). Alternatively, they should be short-lived and broad when consuming inferior substitutes is the principal cause of welfare losses (Klemperer, 1990 ). In contrast, our work considers the original innovator's interest in subsequent innovation, a factor that leads to finite-lived protection. Our mechanism places the original author in a position analagous to that of a social planner. And while a social planner chooses a shorter proprietary period than the platform author, the author substantially internalizes the social gains from innovation and therefore chooses a horizon on first round innovation that brings forward the profits from second round innovation.
Placing the platform author in the position of social planner mitigates a downstream prisoner's dilemma. Subsequent developers benefit from access to each other's proprietary innovation but self-interest limits their willingness to share freely. Seeking to charge each other, disparate owners produce an "anticommons" where people underutilize a valuable nonrival resource (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998) . Welfare improves across the board, however, if all parties can agree to contribute their innovations to a common platform. This parallels an inisghtful rule from the GNU Public License (GPL), adopted by most subsequent free/open licenses, that developer rights to distribute copies, including derivative works, is contingent on giving recipients the same rights that they themselves enjoy. An analagous insight appears in Lichtman (2000) where a platform author limits the prices that makers of attachments can charge, which promotes platform adoption, leading attachment makers to prefer being so limited. Thus, a significant benefit of our research is to balance, then resolve, the tragedies of the commons and the anticommons within a single framework.
Our work also highlights a novel insight-a conundrum evident even in the GPL. Social efficiency requires a grant of long term tenure to the social planner whose role is then to impose short terms on developers. Short terms limit the damage developers would do by denying each other free access.
Thus good resource husbandry implies that platform author tenure must survive cycles of developer innovation. This explains why platforms need sponsors, and why some tenure should be long but most should be short.
This dynamic tension complements the literature on sequential innovation. Green & Scotchmer (1995) argue for longer property rights when innovation proceeds in rounds led by different firms.
If property rights are short, firms appropriate little of the social value of derivative innovations and underinvest in basic research. Our work takes the next practical step and asks, given a platform and potential for sequential innovation, what mechanism offered to follow-on developers maximizes profits and welfare. If network effects are small or the ability to build on the platform is small, we find that the author prefers to go it alone. If, however, either the coefficient of reuse or network effects are large, then the author prefers to engage complementary investment via opening the platform even at the cost of losing profits on the platform itself.
To be precise about terminology, we define a "platform" as any system or architecture in which heterogeneous agents exercise an interest through either consumption or contribution. 3 Cusumano and Gawer (2002) provide an overview of the business opportunities and challenges faced by platform sponsors. Agent heterogeneity allows for possible goal conflict. Interest exercised through consumption or contribution focuses on parties internal to platform evolution as distinct from say competitors whose incentives lie outside the platform. It is these internal motives we seek to harness as a stimulus to innovation.
By this definition, modularity (Simon, 1969; Baldwin & Clark 2000 ) is a desirable efficiency property subordinate to the balance of heterogeneous agent interests. A system can be modular and yet not a platform (e.g. a simple program). Likewise, a system can be a platform and yet not modular (e.g. a simple but integrated protocol or standard). Rather, modularity improves efficiency in response to complexity.
Free software exhibits these properties via the multifaceted interests of users and developers.
Interestingly, our definition of platform also applies to auction sites that match buyers and sellers, credit cards that balance merchants and card-holders, journals that match authors with readers, as well as computer systems, audio-visual equipment, and game consoles that combine multiple vendors and buyer tastes. It also applies to biotechnology and semiconductor patent pools that represent springboards for subsequent products and innovations.
Thus, while we focus on software, whose extraordinary properties of nonrivalry and reusability make it a particularly facile example, we intend the current proposal to apply in at least weak measure to other platform goods. We do not claim relevance, however, for all platforms. At issue is whether innovation can come from "lead users / developers" (von Hippel 1994) whose needs press the boundaries of current platform capabilities. Further, our proposal applies primarily to markets whose scale limits a single firm or agent's ability to anticipate and satisfy all platform needs in a timely manner. In a historical context, managing platform value by stimulating development resembles the 18 th century decision by railroads to allow developers to build on railroad land but then give up these improvements after a suitable time had elapsed. Granting free access immediately, however, contributes nothing to a platform author's profits. Access could have been sold. Tension arises in giving up access to encourage development. Moreover, this same tension arises in promoting subsequent innovation among 3 rd party developers. Promoting adoption by earlier release discourages innovation more than later release.
Theoretical Foundations & Model
We analyze the trade-off between early and late release based on two novel approaches. The first applies two-sided network effects in order to explore how the release of free information benefits those who develop as well as those who consume. The second is a framing innovation that places existing licenses in a space suggesting where unexplored socially optimal licenses might exist.
The network externality model extends Katz and Shapiro (1985) to more diverse and comple- 
Platform Author Problem
In the present context, author A develops a platform for which software developers D create enhancements that add value for consumers C. Given a platform, author A chooses two parameters.
The first is the free platform share σ, a fraction of the platform that consumers can freely adopt and that stimulates developer participation. 4 The author also chooses a proprietary time period t that generates revenues for 3 rd party developers on any enhancements they create. Before t expires, developers can profitably charge consumers for enhancements, but positive prices limit We explore optimal choices for t and σ based on different welfare maximizing criteria, including combinations of access freedom, adoption rates, and revenues. In subsequent analysis, we also allow platform author A to charge a royalty fee φ (possibly zero) of developers who themselves are charging consumers.
Timing
To capture the tension between early and late release, we begin with a simple two period model.
It covers platform value before developer participation, first period developer enhancements, and second period developer enhancements that build on the first. In Figure 1 , t is the time between periods.
2 1
Platform author chooses σ and t.
Developers respond to σ and t and create derivative works. Consumers choose levels of consumption.
Developers observe consumers and create derivative works building on release of period 1. 
Consumer Problem
Consumers know that developer enhancements will be released under the free regime after period t. This introduces a Coasian consumption tradeoff that conditions willingness-to-pay in the current period on discount rate r. We assume that consumers share a common value for the product.
Although made for tractability, this assumption enjoys theoretical support from Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) who show that a point estimate of consumer value is reasonable for large bundles of information goods. If a developer adds value v, this leads simply to choosing price such that p ≤ v(1 − e −r t ). Note that the longer the proprietary period, the more the consumer will pay for A fraction, σ, of the original platform value, V A is made freely available, leaving direct platform profit of (1 − σ) V A . Opening the platform permits developer enhancements, which add value ∆ V , and brings additional consumers to the platform. This process repeats using period 1 as input.
a particular developer enhancement. When the proprietary period is very short, the consumer will pay very little since she knows that the product will soon become free. In the analysis below, we let δ = e −r t .
Given this tradeoff, the platform author factors consumers' strategic behavior into determining the optimal time to release code under a free license. Forcing earlier release of enhancements pulls consumer surplus and participation earlier in time at the cost of reducing developer incentives.
Developer Problem
In order for market incentives to influence innovation, let profit motivated developers produce in direct proportion to (i) the amount of free code they can incorporate and (ii) the length of time they can benefit from their effort. In Section 4.5.1, we also allow non-market incentives to influence development. In any period, developer output y increases in both t and in the open code base Ω.
Let Ω t represent open code at time t, let k r be a re-use coefficient that scales the ability to use open code in new production, and let L(Ω t , t) be labor or effort as a function of costs and the time to recover investments. Then new code created by a developer is k r Ω t L(Ω t , t). We capture the incentive effect of time by replacing L(Ω t , t) with a concave increasing function of time (1 − δ).
We make the innocuous assumptions that developers' enhancements are independent 5 and that value created by a developer is proportional in k v to code created. That is,
To simplify analysis, we collapse the two constants to k = k v k r and aggregate over developers.
Total value created by all developers in period t is then v t = q d t k Ω t (1 − δ). Thus developer numbers, amount of free code, ability to reuse, and incentives can all drive innovation.
Analysis
Our point of departure is to make explicit the chicken and egg relationship between user and developer participation. To model this relationship, we use a two-sided network externality framework.
The network externality term e du measures how much effect the presence of developers has on the size of the use market q u . Conversely, e ud determines how much effect the presence of users has on the size of the developer market q d .
User and Developer Participation
The logic jointly determining the number of users and developers is that as more users adopt a platform, the more developers want to produce for that platform, hence user adoption can grow further still. 6 We define a feedback that gives a convergent sequence for the externality between users and developers. Let N u be the number of core users who consume the platform independent of any developer enhancements. Let N d be the number of core developers who add value independent of any motive to profit from users. Here, N u and N d can be interpreted as "lead" users and developers who participate regardless of any other party's activities.
If Ω is the amount of open code, the first term in the sequence is the increase in the number of developers, λ Ω where λ is the conversion rate of open code to new developers based on having free access. The second term is the increase in users as a function of incremental developers, e du λ Ω where e du is the externality from developers to users. The third term is the increase in developers as a function of incremental users, e ud e du λ Ω, where e ud is the externality from users to developers. This feedback defines a Cauchy sequence that converges so long as 0 ≤ e ud e du < 1.
The total increase in the number of developers and users can then be found by summing odd and even terms respectively. For developers this is λ Ω (1 + e ud e du + (e ud e du ) 2 + (e ud e du ) 3 + ...) and for users this is e du λ Ω (1 + e ud e du + (e ud e du ) 2 + (e ud e du ) 3 + ...). These converge to λ Ω 1−e ud e du and e du λ Ω 1−e ud e du ) respectively. Holding aside Ω as a choice parameter, define market multipliers M u = e du λ 1−e ud e du
. Then, the total number of users and developers are
To account for time, quantities are subscripted q u1 , q u2 , q d1 , q d2 and the open code base is
subscripted Ω 1 and Ω 2 .
Free Code Base
Over two rounds of innovation, the free code base evolves as follows. At time 0, the platform author chooses what proportion, σ of the original platform to free immediately. Free access provides the foundation upon which developers build new platform additions. These additions may be proprietary during the period but must be freely and completely released by the period's end. In period two, developers gain free access to all new additions from period one. In addition, time 0 free access to the platform continues to remain free. Developer ability to reuse code is captured by parameter k. Thus total amount of free code rises in platform author willingness to open the platform, the number of developers who enhance the platform, and the ability to reuse the platform.
As noted above, developer output increases in the length of time over which they can charge users for enhancements.
In order to facilitate analysis of social welfare and firm profit as a function of time, we introduce useful transformations between variables and their first derivatives with respect to time.
Lemma 1
The functions for q 2 and Ω 2 can be defined without the use of derivatives. That is,
Proof. Follows directly from definitions of q d2 , q u2 and Ω 2 .
This lemma facilitates comparison of optimal choices using simplifed expressions.
Welfare Analysis
Total welfare across both two periods has three parts, author profit, developer profit, and consumer surplus. The discounted factor δ shifts net second period value to the first period. We provide detailed expressions for each component below.
Platform Author Profit
Total profit to the platform author π a is the sum of profits on direct sales to users π u a and profits on indirect sales (or royalties) through developers π u a . User sales yield the first two terms. Developer royalties yield the second two terms.
The first term of author profit measures value from users who purchase the non-free platform.
The second term, measures discounted value from incremental second period users who purchase the platform. The third and fourth terms represent royalty fees paid by developers to the platform author during the first and second periods.
Developer Profit
Total developer profit consists of enhancement sales to consumers less the license fee paid to the platform author. It increases in the number of developers, discounted across both periods. Note that we will use π d for industry level developer profit and π di for individual developer profit.
Consumer Surplus
The first consumer surplus term measures value from consuming the free platform. The second and third terms measure consumption of incremental free code, Ω 2 − Ω 1 , by first period consumers plus consumption of second period free code Ω 2 by incremental users, q u2 − q u1 . The fourth and fifth terms represent the retained value consumers did not transfer to developers via payments for enhancements.
Total Welfare
The expression for total welfare W = π a + π d + CS is simpler than equations 5 -7 suggest because wealth transfers have no effect. All σ and (1 − σ) terms, and φ and (1 − φ) terms collapse. Since Ω 1 = σV a , total welfare can be expressed as
The first term is period one developer additions. The second term is second period developer additions plus the value of open code. The third term is first period consumer surplus from the platform (which combines author profit and consumer surplus) plus second period new user surplus less period one double-counting.
In general, the social planner prefers to free the entire platform, σ = 1, but prefers an intermediate value for the proprietary period t after which derivative works become free. Figure 3 provides an illustrative example of this result while Proposition 1 provides the general case.
Proposition 1 (Social planner preferences over openness and time) To maximize welfare, the social planner's optimal contract [σ * , t * ] is a fully open corner solution in σ but an interior (finite) value in t. This result holds for any level of network externality, including zero.
into equation 8. After grouping terms, note that each element has a non-negative derivative with respect to σ, thus establishing the first claim in the proposition. To establish the zero network externality result, substitute e u d = e d u = 0 in M u and M d into the previous expression, take the derivative with respect to σ and note that the result is non-negative. To establish the claim with respect to time, take the derivative of total welfare with respect to t and apply Lemma 1. Note that the derivative of welfare with respect to t at t = 0 is positive. At the other end of the time scale, take the derivative of welfare with respect to δ and evaluate δ = 0 (where t → ∞). The derivative is positive (for any level of network externality) which implies a benefit to lowering t.
This finding stands in contrast to research that argues for arbitrarily narrow but infinitely long protection. The key difference here is the ability to reuse prior innovations. In the context of software, this also argues that a social planner's optimal strategy limits protection to a period in which the discounted useful life is not zero in order that developers can fold first period innovations into second period innovations.
Platform Author Choices
To explore platform author's preferences over σ and t, note that the platform author may prefer a closed regime, some degree of openness, or complete openness of the platform, depending on opportunities for 3 rd party innovation.
For example, in the left hand panel of Figure 4 , the platform author prefers that no platform code be freely released to the developer community. In the middle panel, the network externality term M u is increased from 
Evaluating at σ = 0 and simplifying yields the indicated test. Note that this is sufficient, but not necessary, as A third reason to open the platform, often overloooked in the literature is the intrinsic value of the platform itself. If V a is sufficiently large, the marginal value of incremental sales is less than the marginal value of stimulating either innovation or network effects. That is both parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 imply that σ rises in V a . This also provides a useful test to distinguish a "platform" from a non-platform resource. That is, a resource with too little value V a cannot be a platform for third party innovation and therefore will not be opened by a for profit author. Interestingly, openness implied by a large platform value is not similarly implied by a large user base N u . Both tests imply that a larger fixed pool of users creates incentive to exploit them. Rather, it is network effects and innovation, together with the platform value, that distinctly motivates openness.
In general, the equations supporting π a , and drawn in Figure 4 , allow σ to model a range of In the left hand panel, the platform author prefers a perpetual copyright for developer enhancements. In the right hand panel, the network externality terms M u and M d are both increased from The increase in network externality changes the platform author's preferences over time such that the platform author prefers a finite copyright period. In Proposition 3, we develop a bound for when the platform author prefers a finite copyright duration for follow-on work.
Proposition 3 (Platform author preferences over time)
The platform author prefers a finite copyright duration when the follow expression holds:
Proof. To establish the boundary above, take the derivative of platform profit with respect to δ and evaluate at δ = 0. Rearranging terms provides a more interpretable result.
The first term shrinks in σ and is largest when the platform author chooses to take direct profits from platform consumption. The three-part multiplicative term grows in σ, in the size of the developer base, and in developer network externalities. Note that the second term is bounded below by 1 when reuse k → 0.
In general, the platform author is more likely to prefer finite copyright when code reuse k is large and there is a large developer base that can produce from the open code base. However, even in the absence of any code reuse, it is still possible for the platform author to choose a finite t if φ and σ are small. Because the platform author does not consider consumer surplus, the platform author chooses t to favor incentives rather than access to open code. 7 
Alternative Licenses
A major contribution of this framework is that it generalizes several different types of contracts.
We can then ask which contract optimizes a given welfare criterion under a specific set of parameter . Note that a 95-year corporate copyright is well approximated by a perpetual (infinite) copyright at a reasonable discount rate.
Proposition 4 Open BSD and GPL licenses always create at least as much total welfare as EULA but unless the royalty rate times code reuse is high enough,
, a platform author prefers EULA. The relative profits and welfare for EULA, BSD, and GPL style contracts are respectively:
Proof. These are found by straightforward substitution of corner solutions EULA: While open BSD and GPL style contracts always create at least as much total welfare as closed EULA contracts, they are not necessarily incentive compatible for the platform author. It is possible that sufficiently large royalties, network effects, or developer value-added make a BSDstyle contract a dominant author choice, although the actual BSD license does not require or even expect royalties; so this framework presents a more generous case from the author's perspective.
Note that if the BSD contract forbids royalties, then the platform author strictly prefers EULA.
Freedom motivated developers
It is interesting to note that a BSD contract provides uniformly greater social surplus than the more socially conscious GPL. This result, however, relies critically on the modeling assumption that developers are profit motivated. To probe this further, we examine a model in which developers are motivated by a larger fraction σ of platform code becoming "free". If this is the case, then GPL achieves the highest social surplus of all three licenses. In particular, let α be the fraction of profit motivated developers such that (1 − α) gives the fraction of developers motivated by free access. Then, rewrite the value of developer output v t = k Ω t q dt (1 − δ) to weight effort by relative interest in pricing power and free access. This gives:
Under a mix of motivations, the BSD to GPL welfare ratio shifts from
all the way to
as the proportion of proft motivated developers α shrinks from one to zero. This second ratio is clearly less than 1, showing that a GPL-style contract creates greater welfare in a freedom-motivated context. Assuming that a social planner must offer a single license and that developers exhibit a mix of motives, it is also straightforward to solve for that fraction of freedom motivated developers such that a social planner prefers to switch from BSD to GPL. Interestingly, if developers are motivated strictly by free access, then a GPL contract is socially optimal not just in relative terms but also absolute terms. That is, total welfare under fully freedom-motivated developers α = 0 and GPL exceeds that under fully profit-motivated developers α = 1 and BSD.
Setting aside difficult questions on the costs of subsidy and the problem of moral hazard, this advantage parallels certain arguments from the Free Software Foundation has made without the benefit of formal analysis.
Welfare parity between these contracts is restored if freedom motivated developers do not ex- That is
Proof. Propositions 1 and 2 show that 0 ≤ t * ≤ ∞ is optimal relative to t * = 0 and t * = ∞.
Private Subcontracting
In , and σ = 1 but note that there is no profit penalty to the platform author since sharing occurs only privately among subcontractors.
The primary disadvantage of a closed system, however, is that network effects are shut down as closed contracts prevent user access to the underlying code, they disallow modification, and they forbid code sharing. This reduction in network effects can be captured by letting λ, the conversion rate of open code to new developers for the platform, go to zero. Instead, the firm contracts with 
To prove the first claim, note that either λ = 0 implies M u = 0, with a ratio of This proposition argues for decentralized innovation when user-developer network effects rise far enough. What is also interesting is that given any positive level of network effects, a more valuable platform may itself justify freeing the platform in order to increase author profits, as it also did in Proposition 2. Note that the decentralized innovation is achieved without bargaining costs. A default open contract with σ and t gives developers an option to enter the market for any fixed costs up to the amount they can recover, and without current period disclosure to the platform author. They need not risk disclosing their idea to the monopsony platform author who could potentially appropriate its value. 
Developer actions in the absence of contract
We now turn to the defect, cooperate case. There are two important differences between profit under DC versus CC. The first is that a profit-motivated defector can charge the full price (value) for their add-on. The second is that the defecting developer expends full effort such that the production function changes from k Ω (1 − δ) to k Ω. These substitutions lead to
Proposition 6 Defect, defect (DD) constitutes a dominant pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. We show a prisoners' dilemma as follows. A direct comparison of the CC and DC profits shows that a profit-motivated developer prefers to defect when the other developers cooperate. 
With some algebraic manipulation, it can be shown that
The first term,
3+k−δ , is bounded above by 1/3. For the inequality to hold, the second and third terms must overcome the first. The ratio of first and second period open code,
, grows in network effects, code reuse k, and time to release t. The ratio of first and second period users, qu 2 qu 1 grows similarly. In regimes characterized by no ability to reuse code, such that k = 0, developers never prefer to enter a contractual agreement to cooperate. However, higher network effects can offset a low code reuse coefficient and make firms willing to submit to contractual enforcement of cooperation.
Conclusions
This article explores the tension between market incentives that foster innovation, and access freedoms that furnish social welfare. Employing two-sided network externalities, we explore how freeing information benefits those who develop as well as those who consume. We consider the welfare of consumers, developers, and platform authors, and show that environmental parameters such as the size of the consumer population, the developer pool, the magnitude and source of externalities, and the ability to reuse information can affect the optimal choice of time to release and degree of openness.
One contribution of this research is to explore mechanisms that lead to innovation and welfare, specifically network effects and information reuse. We find that either factor can provide sufficient reason to open proprietary systems. Reuse alone can motivate openness. Likewise, network effects alone can also motivate openness, even to the point of tolerating limited piracy, interpreted as free user access.
Interestingly, we find that in the presence of reuse, a higher intrinsic platform value can provide
reason to become open. This also provides means to distinguish a platform resource from a nonplatform resource, based on its suitability for decentralized third party innovation.
A second contribution is to demonstrate how better licensing can move a monopolist in the direction of a social planner. A platform author faces the innovation versus access tradeoff as a choice between fostering platform adoption and complementary investment versus capturing immediate profits on the platform itself. We show how such a firm benefits by using contracts and property rights to grow its interest in downstream innovation. Opening a platform increases the attractiveness of complementary third party investment. The benefit of decentralized innovation is strong enough that open contracts with modest royalties, offered to all developers, can be more profitable than closed Nash bargaining contracts with lead developers. This occurs when user-developer feedback effects pass a threshold of value.
As with GPL, the benefit of decentralization is also achieved via a default contract without negotiation costs. Under traditional closed licenses, a third party developer with a good idea might need to negotiate access to platform source material. Either through negotiation or by observing the identity of the developer, however, the original firm might discern the idea and appropriate it. In practice, large software firms have been accused of this by smaller software firms (Jackson, 1999) . This risk reduces their willingness to invest or disclose the idea ex ante. In contrast, a free license with third party rights to redistribute requires no negotation and avoids monopsony hold-up from the platform author.
Third, in answer to the question of how to balance market incentives and access freedom, we offer two clarifications. In terms of time, we find that the socially optimal protection is not arbitrarily long. This finding stands in contrast to important contributions in economics and law that argue for infinitely long and narrow or infinitely short and broad protections (Gilbert & Shapiro 1990; Klemperer 1990 ) or for time extension based on investment and maintenance (Landes & Posner 2003; Wagner 2003) . The difference is that we explicitly model later period innovation where prices on reusable information increase hold-up and decrease network effects.
Then, in terms of governance, we find that a platform author needs long term tenure in order to expressly enforce shorter terms on downstream developers. An interest in downstream innovation resembles the theme of "standing on the shoulders of giants" (Green & Scotchmer 1995) . In addition, however, we identify a prisoner's dilemma in which profit motivated developers individually prefer to withhold their innovations from the free platform base but collectively prefer to contribute.
Disclosure requirements resolve problems of multi-party hold-up and information reuse.
Fourth, the ideal license depends on the distribution of profit and freedom motivated developers.
Setting aside budget constraints, the highest total welfare is achieved under freedom motivated developers without need of a proprietary period. The presence of any profit motivated developers, however, implies that the optimal contract includes the offer of a finite proprietary period. This option stimulates investment among those who do require pricing power but is not exercised by those who do not.
In terms of modeling, a final contribution is to build a general framework within which to compare licensing archetypes. This spans distinct business models ranging from fully open to fully closed, such as those based on BSD, APIs, and EULAs. It also includes the ability to compare licenses based on developer motives and decentralized open licenses versus targeted subcontracts.
To accomplish this, a key innovation is to develop a production function for enhancements on one side of the market, in a model of two-sided network effects. The debate on how and when to open a platform is subtle and complex. Factors are often omitted to make analysis tractible. It is our hope that a step towards understanding these tradeoffs will contribute to this debate, and to the design of contracts to support platform development.
